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Abstract 
Following neo-Aristotelians Alasdair MacIntyre and Martha Nussbaum, we claim 
that humans are story-telling animals who learn from the stories of diverse others. 
Moral agents use rational emotions, such as compassion, which is our focus here, to 
imaginatively reconstruct others’ thoughts, feelings and goals. In turn, this 
imaginative reconstruction plays a crucial role in deliberating and discerning how to 
act. A body of literature has developed in support of the role narrative artworks (i.e. 
novels and films) can play in allowing us the opportunity to engage imaginatively 
and sympathetically with diverse characters and scenarios in a safe protected space 
that is created by the fictional world. By practising what Nussbaum calls a ‘loving 
attitude’, her version of ethical attention, we can form virtuous habits that lead to 
phronesis (practical wisdom). In this paper, and taking compassion as an illustrative 
focus, we examine the ways that students’ moral education might usefully develop 
from engaging with narrative artworks through Philosophy for Children (P4C), 
where philosophy is a praxis, conducted in a classroom setting using a Community 
of Inquiry (CoI). We argue that narrative artworks provide useful stimulus material 
to engage students, generate student questions, and motivate philosophical dialogue 
and the formation of good habits, which, in turn, supports the argument for 
philosophy to be taught in schools.  
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Introduction 
There are good prima facie reasons for accepting that children engage in narrative 
artworks in various aspects of their education and schooling. Whether through 
subject-based curricula (such as literature, history, geography, social studies, art and 
drama), through pastoral support programmes, or through other educational 
activities (such as excursions to museums), narrative artworks are a common feature 
of children’s lived experience. Our interest here is the extent to which, and ways in 
which, children’s educational engagements with narrative artworks hold the 
potential to connect to philosophical notions of the good life and human flourishing.  
The question of how one might live a good life has been—and continues to be—a 
central, shared concern of philosophers and educators. We start by making two 
suggestions: (1) that humans are story-telling animals; and, (2) that narrative 
artworks provide a valuable resource for engaging with the stories of diverse others, 
including regarding the nature of the good life and human flourishing. On the basis 
of these two suggestions we seek to make two, related and further claims of import 
for education: (1) that educators have a responsibility to engage children in 
specifically philosophical questions about the stories they hear, read, share and 
explore—that is, questions which engage children with ideas of human nature and 
what it means to live a good life; and, (2) that engaging in such specifically 
philosophical questions places certain important curricular and pedagogical 
demands upon schools and teachers. In order to illustrate the sorts of arguments we 
wish to make in the paper, we focus specifically on the virtue of compassion as a 
morally educative virtue.  
To advance these arguments, and following this introduction, the paper comprises 
three main sections. In the first, we make some rudimentary comments about 
humans as story-telling animals. In the second, we offer a deeper analysis of the 
educational value of narrative artworks. In this second section, we draw on the 
virtue of compassion to illustrate the arguments we seek to make. In the third 
section, we explore some core educational implications of our analysis, including the 
need to give explicit attention to philosophy and philosophical questions in order to 
maximise the educational value of narrative artworks.  
The significance of the analysis we offer lies in the extent to which narrative 
artworks can, and should, be considered as moral resources for educators; moral 
resources, that is, which require explicit engagement with philosophical ideas, 
concepts and questions if they are to provide a formative function. In this way we 
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are making a stronger claim than simply defending stories as sources of 
entertainment, which is, of course, another valid function of stories. On our reading, 
we concur with Nussbaum’s suggestions that ‘certain novels are, irreplaceably, 
works of moral philosophy’ and that ‘the novel can be a paradigm of moral activity’ 
(Nussbaum 1987, p. 170). In concurring, however, we are both mindful of, and 
interested in, the pedagogical implications of such a claim.  
We should also note that for the purposes of this paper, and for reasons of space, we 
do not provide a precise overall account of the moral basis of stories. While there are 
interesting and important philosophical and educational debates concerning the 
relationship between the aesthetic and moral worth of works of art (see, for example, 
Carroll 2000; Mejia & Montoya 2017; D’Olimpio 2017) it will suffice for our purposes 
here to assume the position defended by Carroll (2000) of moderate moralism (or 
Gaut’s ethicism, again see Carroll 2000) that works of art—such as novels and stories 
—contain at least some moral content, and such moral content may be evaluated in 
light of the overall or aesthetic evaluation of artworks. This seems particularly 
reasonable when it comes to narrative artworks, as Nussbaum notes, which 
necessarily raise ethical questions pertaining to life (Nussbaum 1998). Thus, we 
maintain that narrative artworks contain moral content which may be critiqued and 
responded to by readers of such texts.  
 
Humans as story-telling animals 
Humans are story-telling animals. We tell the narratives of our lives and the world 
in which we live, and the versions of the stories we tell affect ourselves as well as 
others with whom we share these tales. The ancient Greek philosophers were aware 
of this, with Plato worrying about the effects of stories on children and citizens. In 
Book III of the Republic, he refers to censorship and the supervision of story-tellers 
(including the artists and the poets). Aristotle was similarly aware of the power of 
stories, yet held a more favourable view of their role in society, as evidenced in the 
Poetics in which he speaks of stories as a form of imitation of life, which is natural to 
children. We learn through imitation, he claims, and then represent the truth we 
discover in various ways to others. It is through dialogue that we shape a shared 
understanding of the world we inhabit.  
Medieval thinkers St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas similarly expressed an 
understanding of the way in which stories can help us to find meaning in life. The 
example of the role of parables and stories of scripture illustrate how narratives can 
connect diverse people, uniting them in a shared vision of values and belief. 
The ethics of narrative art  Journal of Philosophy in Schools 5(1) 
95 
Influenced by these Christian philosophers, and following Aristotle, contemporary 
virtue ethicist Alasdair MacIntyre defends an account of humans as story-telling 
animals in After Virtue (1981/1984). MacIntyre argues: 
A central thesis then begins to emerge: man is in his actions and practice, as 
well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal. He is not essentially, 
but becomes through his history, a teller of stories that aspire to truth. But the 
key question for men is not about their own authorship; I can only answer the 
question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question ‘Of what story or 
stories do I find myself a part?’. (1984, p. 216) 
Indeed, the philosophical tradition of Philosophy for Children (P4C) that was started 
by Matthew Lipman and the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for 
Children (IAPC) at Montclair State University in New Jersey, USA, sought to return 
to the idea that (particular) stories were the perfect vehicle for doing philosophy 
with children for two reasons; they were engaging and age-appropriate. At the time 
Lipman was writing, the university departments teaching philosophy tended 
towards content-driven lectures without any emphasis on the pragmatic doing of 
philosophy. The doing of philosophy, he argued, was important to teach children 
philosophical thinking skills, rather than solely learning philosophical content or the 
history of ideas by rote. The idea that literature could be a vehicle for philosophical 
knowledge was not new, even if nearly forgotten by the Western analytic tradition of 
the academy at the time in which Lipman was writing. It is noted:  
For the greater part of their history in Western civilisation, literature and 
philosophy have been estranged from one another. But this was hardly the case 
during those early centuries in Greece which saw the emergence of 
philosophical thinking. Prior to Aristotle, in fact, philosophy was virtually 
always embodied in some literary vehicle. There were the aphorisms of 
Heraclitus and the poetry of Parmenides, just as there were later to be the 
dramatic dialogues of Plato. (Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan 1977, p. 23) 
Like Lipman, we argue that narratives can be philosophical; they can tell truths and 
be morally educative. Storytelling, in which authors make use of language and the 
mode of writing to communicate their ideas, is a powerful medium by which one 
may express morality and influence others. According to Iris Murdoch, judgements 
about value(s) are unavoidable in narrative works as, ‘one cannot avoid value 
judgements. Values show, and show clearly, in literature’ (Murdoch, quoted in 
Magee 1978, p. 278). Value judgements are embedded in our language and the 
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words we use often imply or presume certain kinds of moral evaluations. Murdoch 
notes that:  
It is important to remember that language itself is a moral medium, almost all 
uses of language convey value. This is one reason why we are almost always 
morally active. Life is soaked in the moral, literature is soaked in the moral … 
So the novelist is revealing his values by any sort of writing which he may do. 
He is particularly bound to make moral judgements in so far as his subject-
matter is the behaviour of human beings. (Murdoch 1998, pp. 27-28) 
In the sections which follow we examine in further detail the ways in which 
particular narratives might be philosophical, conveying truth and values, in a way 
that may be deemed to be morally educative when engaged with in a certain way.  
 
The educative value of narrative artworks 
Drawing upon Aristotle, as well as Iris Murdoch, Martha Nussbaum argues that we 
can, through imaginative and compassionate engagement with the stories of diverse 
others, learn to adopt a moral attitude. We can practise this caring disposition when 
hearing about the experiences of others, even—and perhaps even more so—if these 
others are fictional characters.  
One way we can learn, morally, from narrative artworks, is by practising a ‘loving 
attitude’ or caring disposition that eventually becomes a rational habit engrained in 
our character. By practising this moral attitude in relation to characters in stories, we 
are protected in a safe fictional space and therefore may find it easier to take the 
perspective of others. Nussbaum writes: 
The aesthetic activity, which takes place in a safe and protected ‘potential space’ 
where our own safety is not immediately threatened, harnesses the pleasure of 
exploring to the neediness and insufficiency that is its object, thus making our 
limitations pleasing, and at least somewhat less threatening, to ourselves. 
(Nussbaum 2001, p. 244) 
In her work, Nussbaum (2001, p. 301) focuses on the notion of compassion, which 
she terms an ‘intelligent emotion’, as providing an important disposition to be 
developed through engagement with narrative artworks. Crucial in this regard are 
the ways in which narrative artworks allow us both to engage with the thoughts, 
feelings and goals of key protagonists and to use our imaginative capacities to 
develop the sympathy and empathy for others—including others who are different 
from ourselves—which compassion requires. Literary artworks are not only life-like 
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enough, but also best capture the subtleties of real moral dilemmas and thus provide 
us with a useful proxy in order to practise moral discernment.  
To understand this last point, we must appreciate certain features of compassion. 
The first concerns the extent to which compassion requires some form of harmony 
between sympathy (the care-based sorrow we feel at the suffering of others) and 
empathy (the ‘imaginative reconstruction’, to use Blum’s (1987, p. 232) term, of the 
others’ suffering, which blends self- and other-focused role-taking (for a fuller 
discussion of these elements of compassion, see Peterson 2017). Once these two 
characteristics of compassion are identified, the realisation that one’s imaginative 
reconstruction of an other (in compassion’s case an other who is suffering) may be 
fallible becomes crucial, and moves the compassionate subject to engage further in 
order to understand the other. Such understanding forms a crucial part in the 
discernment and deliberation central to phronesis (or practical wisdom).  
To possess moral virtues means, on Aristotle’s (2009, p. 30) account, ‘to feel them at 
the right time, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the 
right motive, and in the right way’. Given this, understanding the other—and in turn 
understanding ourselves—in ways which seek to reduce the empathic gap seem 
crucial, and to this end particular forms of narrative artwork are particularly apt. As 
Nussbaum (2001, p. 328) suggests, ‘only in fiction is the mind of the other 
transparent. The empathetic person attempts to reconstruct the mental experience of 
another’. Through engaging with those of others, the compassionate agent adopts a 
more reflexive understanding of their own thoughts and feelings. Certainly, 
narratives must be somewhat like our own world and experiences in order for us to 
identify with, understand and interpret them correctly; if novels weren’t at all based 
in reality they wouldn’t make any sense. This is evident as novels often make use of 
linear time and the characters are humans with thoughts and emotions and act upon 
a world in a similar way to us. Even science fiction stories have enough similarities 
to make them relevant and meaningful to their readers. Nussbaum argues that, if we 
meaningfully engage with and practise an ethical mode of attention to scenarios and 
characters depicted, this can enable us to engage with and learn, two particular 
philosophical/moral concerns: (1) moral truth and (2) human flourishing. 
Moral truth on this account is wider than that of a solely propositional account. Here 
Nussbaum draws upon the pragmatist and author Henry James, claiming that moral 
knowledge restricted to propositions would be incomplete and what is needed is a 
broader understanding of moral knowledge. Nussbaum argues, ‘Moral knowledge, 
James suggests, is not simply intellectual grasp of propositions; it is not even simply 
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intellectual grasp of particular facts; it is perception. It is seeing a complex, concrete 
reality in a highly lucid and richly responsive way; it is taking in what is there, with 
imagination and feeling.’ (Nussbaum 1992, p. 152).  
In illustrating her point, Nussbaum goes into great detail in her analysis of classical 
works of literature such as Henry James’ The Golden Bowl (1905). James’ work is 
considered as an example of (perhaps rare) narrative art that is both aesthetically 
and ethically good. The intricate detail with which James describes the characters, 
their inner worlds, as well as their moral dilemmas is what particularly resonates 
with the attentive reader, allowing a caring attitude to be adopted to fallible, human 
characters that we recognise are ‘like us’ in important respects. As we engage 
imaginatively with the plight of these fictional others, we care about the decisions 
they make and the consequences of their actions in the fictional storyworld. In this 
way, the empathetic reader is practising a moral attitude of compassion and 
sympathetic engagement with other(s) who differ to themselves. A central idea 
defended here is that the nuances of moral judgement sometimes escape the black 
and white depiction of analytic moral philosophy and are better expressed in 
narrative form. In this way, Nussbaum believes that moral philosophers would do 
well to consider A Golden Bowl a work of moral philosophy! It is the detail and 
nuance of good narrative artworks that allows for sympathetic engagement with the 
characters’ thoughts, intentions, feelings, behaviour and circumstances.  
A key aspect of this sympathetic engagement is the potential of good narrative 
artworks to engage us in dialogue and reflection about human flourishing and what 
it means to live a good life (for a more detailed and nuanced philosophical 
discussion of how readers engage with narrative works, see Mejia & Montoya 2017; 
Currie 1997; Kreitman 2006). In her work on compassion, Nussbaum (2001) identifies 
eudaimonistic judgement as central to compassion. When we exercise this judgement 
we become closer to the other who is suffering; that is, we come to see them and 
their humanity as inherently important to our own lives. As Nussbaum (1997, p. 319) 
explains ‘she must take that person’s ill as affecting her own flourishing. In effect, 
she must make herself vulnerable in the person of another’. In this way, when 
compassion is in action we not only recognise the cause of the other, we bring that 
cause into our own goals. A crucial part of this process is understanding what 
human flourishing and conceptions of the good life are so far as those suffering are 
concerned. As these may be rather different to our own, a fundamental requirement 
of the compassionate agent is to extend their compassion to those different to 
themselves and, indeed, to engage with such difference. 
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In focusing on the value of narrative artworks in relation to moral truth and human 
flourishing, Nussbaum offers a positive causal link between morality and literature 
as she believes that good literature can assist us in understanding morality, as well as 
enable the practise of virtuous conduct and ethical decision-making in our everyday 
lives. By practising a loving attitude towards characters in works of fiction, we care 
about their plight. If we practise this moral attitude firstly in the safe fictional space, 
we can then apply it to real life others we encounter.  
This causal argument will only work if we agree with Nussbaum’s starting point, 
that humans are rational and emotional, embodied and contextual. The good life, on 
such an account, requires others as well as myself to flourish, and communities to 
support and promote healthy policies and institutions conducive to this flourishing 
(eudaimonia). This contextual, empirical approach to moral value entails that the 
search for exceptionless moral rules is misguided, even if general capabilities, for 
instance, are useful and worth legislating at a societal or global level. At the level of 
personal decision-making, the virtue ethicist allows for contextual consideration of 
moral acts and will further point out that how I act upon the virtue of, for instance, 
compassion, depends on the situation at hand and the people involved in the moral 
context under consideration. All of these factors, discerned through practical 
wisdom, will impact upon the moral appropriateness of the agent’s response. Thus 
we can see how Nussbaum’s ‘loving attitude’, her version of ethical attention, 
encourages a certain perspective to be adopted with reference to ethical situations 
and decision-making. This loving attitude calls on the love or compassion (a feeling 
component with a cognitive element as well as a volitional aspect) working 
alongside the intellect and the imagination. These three elements work together in 
order to understand the facts of a particular situation, whereby the ethical agent may 
empathise by imaginatively engaging with the plight of the people in the scenario 
and then ‘seeing’ how to appropriately respond. The imagination, emotions and 
narratives, then, are important to a holistic approach to being human. Nussbaum 
explains: 
I defend the literary imagination precisely because it seems to me an essential 
ingredient of an ethical stance that asks us to concern ourselves with the good 
of other people whose lives are distant from our own … an ethics of impartial 
respect for human dignity will fail to engage real human beings unless they are 
capable of entering imaginatively into the lives of distant others and to have 
emotions related to that participation. (Nussbaum 1995, xvi) 
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Engaging students in narrative artworks – the need for philosophy 
In this section, we build on the arguments advanced so far to explore some 
pedagogical possibilities central to engaging students in narrative artworks. Before 
exploring the pedagogical possibilities, we wish briefly to spend some time first 
setting out some justifications for the place of philosophy within the curriculum of 
schools, in particular those curricula experienced by children before the age of 16. 
Such justifications are multiple, interconnected and recognise both empirical and 
normative concerns. The first is the idea alluded to previously that young people 
already engage in various ways with the sorts of questions central to philosophy and 
philosophical investigation. Whether through familial, community, religious, media 
or peer-based interactions, questions concerning who we are, how we live our lives, 
how and why we relate to others, and what our rights and responsibilities are (to 
give just a few examples), are ones which are prominent in the daily lives of young 
people. In other words, young people are already likely to be philosophically active, 
but not necessarily with the support and structure to make sense of such activity in a 
structured and philosophically rigorous manner. 
A second reason for including philosophy in the school curriculum relates to the 
sorts of questions young people are likely to be considering as part of their daily 
lives, which are also questions which feature within the aims and/or curricula of 
Westernised educational jurisdictions, but which may remain under-explored 
without specific attention and careful cultivation. Our focus on compassion 
illustrates this point rather well. The goal of educating young people to be 
compassionate (sometimes also expressed through associated terms such as empathy 
and care) is not uncommon within official curricula, educational practice and 
educational literature1. It is a goal which transcends narrow educational outcomes 
relating to economic utility and academic achievement, and which speaks of our 
relationship to others as human beings. As Peterson (2017) has argued elsewhere, 
cultivating compassion is not a process which is either simple or straightforward, 
but rather one which requires careful, targeted and consistent nurturing. Such 
nurturing involves some level of engagement with concepts, ideas, and processes 
which are precisely philosophical. Let us take an example to illustrate. If a goal of 
education and schooling is to educate compassionate young people—a goal which 
                                                          
1 There are too many examples to cite here, but –and for example–the current version of the National 
Australian Curriculum includes a focus on care and compassion, as well as empathy, for instance as 
identified under the general capability entitled ‘ethical understanding’. Empathy also features 
strongly within the International Baccalaureate curriculum. Initiatives such as the Social and 
Emotional Aspects of Learning programme in England provide practical instances of such a focus.  
The ethics of narrative art  Journal of Philosophy in Schools 5(1) 
101 
we have argued here involves engaging with narratives—then engaging with 
notions of human flourishing and what it means to lead a good life are crucial. As 
we have suggested above, educating about and for compassion involves us in 
coming to understand—through deliberation with others and within ourselves—
eudaimonistic judgements. Such deliberation ‘requires a capacity for critical reflection, 
consideration of alternative possibilities, and a genuine concern for truth and clarity’ 
(Cam 2014, p. 1204); in other words, the development of a particular form of 
practical wisdom through which young people seek to discern appropriate moral 
responses within given contexts. 
Third, there is a growing body of empirical research which suggests important 
outcomes for pupils’ cognitive and socio-emotional development through 
engagement with philosophical ideas and processes (Millett & Tapper 2012; Topping 
& Trickey 2007a, 2007b; Trickey & Topping 2006; Fair et al. 2015a, 2015b; EEF 2015; 
Gorard, Siddiqui & See 2017). Such research is being further invested in, as 
exemplified by the Education Endowment Foundation of the UK having awarded 
SAPERE (Society for the Advancement of Philosophical Enquiry and Reflection in 
Education) a £1,204,000 grant in 2016 to further test the empirical results of children 
studying philosophy on children’s social skills and cognitive abilities. The results of 
this second study will be published in 20212.  
In offering these justifications for philosophy in the school curriculum we are not 
suggesting that philosophy necessarily needs to exist as a separate and distinct 
curriculum subject. Our weaker claim is that, taught well, philosophy may be 
engaged with within existing subjects, but this requires explicit cultivation, and 
preferably by teachers who have themselves been educated in the field of 
philosophy. Our stronger claim is that teaching philosophy and ethics as a distinct 
curriculum subject using a pedagogy that prioritises the students’ own questions 
and includes narratives would allow students to explicitly reflect upon the ethical 
values, norms and concerns central to their good life in a way that is not usually 
invited or encouraged in other subjects. In both claims, we are suggesting that 
without explicit focus and cultivation the contribution of philosophy is left to 
chance, and as a result may be underplayed or neglected altogether. 
 
Philosophical pedagogy using narratives 
                                                          
2 https://educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/our-work/projects/sapere-philosophy-for-children-
effectiveness-trial/ for more details  
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In the preceding sections, we have argued that humans are story-telling beings and 
that narrative artworks are of ethical and educative value for the extent to which 
they provide possibilities for engaging with core moral ideas. So far as the education 
of children in schools is concerned, however, it seems appropriate to suggest that 
while narrative artworks provide the potential for moral and philosophical learning, 
such educative outcomes require explicit cultivation in order to be realised in 
practice. One can readily imagine, for example, a child in school reading Dickens’ A 
Tale of Two Cities (1859) who does not necessarily engage with the text’s central and 
deep moral content without the requisite support and pedagogical intervention of 
the teacher. In this section, we suggest some key pedagogical considerations for 
engaging children with narrative artworks, suggesting as we do so that each of these 
considerations requires teachers to engage explicitly in essentially philosophical 
questions, in both the construction of materials (the selection and adaptation of 
resources and associated activities, for example) and their use with children. Indeed, 
Nussbaum herself is aware of the objection that critics such as Richard Posner aim at 
her claim that narrative artworks can be morally educative. Posner cites instances of 
literature-loving Nazis and English professors who are no more moral than anyone 
else (Posner 1997, pp. 4-5) while also reminding us of the importance of a good 
upbringing when it comes to moral formation. However, Nussbaum needn’t deny 
these examples in order to still defend her position. In fact, she happily grants 
Posner’s point that empathy in and of itself will not sufficiently motivate good 
action, and such an emotion must be grounded in a good early education in 
childhood for it to motivate any moral concern for others (Nussbaum 1998, p. 352). 
Nussbaum simply claims that some literature can have a morally beneficial effect, 
not that it always will. However, for those instances where a good narrative artwork 
does have such an effect, the reading of that work itself can be deemed a moral act.  
A claim defended here with respect to the morally educative power of certain 
narratives is that fictional stories can articulate moral truth. Again, we ought to 
respond to the skeptic who enquires that, while adopting a caring disposition 
towards fictional stories may seem like a nice thing to do, how does that result in 
moral truth? Furthermore, how does it entail learning about moral truths rather than 
simply confirming moral truths the reader already knows? This criticism suggests 
that a reader must already be aware of the atrocities of, for instance, slavery, in order 
to appropriately empathise with Huck and Jim in Huckleberry Finn (Twain 1884). 
Propositional moral truths, or knowing that may not be the kind of truths we are 
learning through our engagement with literature. About this, Posner or the skeptic 
may be correct. However, drawing upon Gilbert Ryle’s distinction between knowing 
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that and knowing how, we may be learning about the contextual application of 
morality or ‘what it is like’ via imaginatively adopting other perspectives and 
thinking through various scenarios in our minds. This knowing how or ‘knowing what 
it is like’ is a pragmatic aspect of moral knowledge (Hepburn 1990). It is worth 
noting, though, for the aesthetically and ethically good artwork to have such an 
effect, the reader themselves must be appropriately sensitive and adopt a loving 
attitude in order to engage compassionately with the characters and scenario 
depicted. This is precisely why our focus on how to engage with appropriate 
narrative texts in the classroom via encouraging students to practice a loving 
attitude or the virtue of compassion is so important. And on this point of how this 
may be done, pedagogically, Nussbaum is silent. 
If we accept, as we would wish to do, that narrative artworks offer crucial 
educational possibilities, a further question becomes precisely which artworks. At a 
general level, there is some agreement that not all works of art offer the same 
educational potential in this regard. That is, while some (good) narrative artworks 
may have a morally educative role to play, the role of other (less good) narrative 
artworks is less certain. As Nussbaum notes: 
One can think of works of art which can be contemplated reasonably well 
without asking any urgent questions about how one should live. Abstract 
formalist paintings are sometimes of this character, and some intricate but non-
programmatic works of music (though by no means all). But it seems highly 
unlikely that a responsive reading of any complex literary work is utterly 
detached from concerns about time and death, about pain and the 
transcendence of pain, and so on -- all the material of ‘how one should live’ 
questions as I have conceived it. (Nussbaum 1998, p. 358) 
According to Nussbaum (2001, p. 433) ‘the fact that Sophoclean tragedy inspires 
compassion for human suffering and the fact that it is great and powerful poetry are 
not independent facts: it is the poetic excellence that conveys compassion to the 
spectator, cutting through the habits of the everyday’; while Bohlin (2005, p. 15) 
identifies the challenges educators face from ‘the range of negative narrative images 
and stimuli that feed the imaginations and aspirations of young people’, including 
‘widely popularized books that idealize the fast track to fame and fortune’. 
Crucial here is the role of narratives in permitting pupils to engage with the 
thoughts, feelings and goals of others, including tracing how these develop and 
respond to formative experiences. In her work on teaching character through 
literature, Bohlin (2005, p. 49) refers to such experiences as ‘morally pivotal points’—
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events through which characters ‘reassess or refine their life goal(s) or path(s)’. 
When a philosophical approach is taken, literature and testimony enables pupils to 
consider and explore the characters and their actions involved in relation to their 
own responses in ways which allow and shape reflection on the good life and 
human flourishing. In this way, narrative artworks engaged with philosophically 
can allow young people to contemplate how their character and actions—including 
virtuous actions—represent expressions of themselves. As Bohlin (2005, p. 18) 
contends, it can provide a tool for reflection on character which ‘happens somewhere 
between the heart and the will, every time characters make a choice, particularly 
choices that somehow define who they are and mark an important change of focus’. 
To frame such explorations, Bohlin helpfully sets out four common features—each of 
them apt for exploring compassion—upon which teachers can focus in teaching 
character through literature: (i) ‘relationships’; (ii) ‘learning from pain and acquiring 
new pleasures’; (iii) ‘thoughtful reflection’; and, (iv) ‘courage to face the truth (about 
reality, oneself, and others)’ (2005, p. 25). To reinforce the point being made here: 
narrative artworks clearly have the potential to move children to feel and express 
sympathy, empathy and compassion whether or not these are intended by teachers. 
However, without an explicit and philosophically aware discussion of those feelings 
—including their cognitive dimensions—the ethical and educative potential of such 
artworks are neglected, and are so in ways which restrict children’s moral 
development.  
 
The philosophical community of inquiry  
The philosophical community of inquiry (CoI) provides a particularly apt 
pedagogical tool to foster the explicit and philosophical discussion required to draw 
out the moral learning of narrative artworks. In a CoI, participants are seated in an 
inward-facing circle and the teacher facilitates a discussion based on the students’ 
own questions. In order to generate the students’ questions, teachers may firstly use 
an age-appropriate text. Traditionally, Lipman used novels he wrote, such as Harry 
Stottlemeier’s Discovery (1974), which were imbued with philosophical ideas and 
involved characters discussing ideas and reflecting on experiences that would be 
similar to those encountered by school-aged children. The relevant chapter would be 
read aloud, paragraph by paragraph, by those seated in the CoI and then, after a 
brainstorming session or activity, a central question would be democratically 
decided upon by the group as the focus for the ensuing CoI. This central question 
should be philosophical: open, ‘deep’, and not a question that yields an immediately 
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obvious answer. As facilitator of the discussion rather than the authoritarian source 
of all knowledge, a teacher’s role in the CoI is radically altered. In a CoI the focus is 
not on learning philosophical content by rote, but, rather, on doing philosophy in 
order to develop critical thinking, caring responses, creativity and the ability to work 
together collaboratively with respect for diverse ideas in the search for truth and 
wisdom. 
By commencing a CoI with a narrative, the students are encouraged to identify with 
the main character, such as Harry, and place themselves in the shoes of this character 
as he seeks to understand concepts and refine arguments. The CoI dialogue that 
follows is student-led and, ideally, sees participants willing to critically engage with 
their own and others’ ideas, while compassionately responding to the views of 
others as they are encountered. Far from there being ‘no correct answers’, the 
philosophical CoI should see participants move away from the worst answers or 
arguments and move towards more reasonable, justified ideas while also 
recognising a common humanity, even with those with whose ideas one disagrees. 
As Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan remark: 
To the extent that philosophy presents a range of alternative views about 
values, meaning and knowledge itself, it liberates children from the dogmatism 
of ignorance, outlines relative considerations that have been developed, and 
encourages that ‘thinking for oneself’ which is so much the mark of a truly 
educated person. (1977, p. 11) 
Teacher training is central to the aim of a CoI generating a philosophical dialogue and 
thus training the philosophical thinking skills of its participants. Lipman, Sharp and 
Oscanyan distinguish between a conversation, a good conversation, and a 
philosophical conversation. A conversation may be disjointed and superficial where 
as a good conversation may have flow and direction and arrive at a conclusion or 
resolution. A philosophical conversation is a good conversation that pertains to deep 
ideas, and seeks to clarify concepts that may be debated or arguments that may not 
be entirely settled (such as ‘what makes a good person?’ or ‘does God exist’?). The 
teacher must have training in both the P4C and CoI pedagogy as well as in the study 
of philosophy, otherwise they may not develop a philosophical ear to recognise the 
philosophical nature or potential in children’s contributions or questions. To this 
effect:  
Further, in regard to the training of teachers to encourage philosophical 
thinking, it is the exposure to and the involvement with the history of 
philosophical ideas that enables a prospective teacher to develop an 
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appreciation for philosophical questioning himself. This sensitivity is essential 
if one is even to hear the philosophical significance of what children say. If one 
cannot hear the philosophical dimension, then it is inconceivable to expect the 
teacher to aid children in coming to a deeper awareness of it themselves. 
(Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan 1977, p. 11) 
The role of the teacher, even in a student-led CoI, is thus pivotal in guiding students 
to critically reflect and compassionately consider the ideas, examples and associated 
feelings of others as well as their own. Participating in a CoI provides the individual 
with an opportunity to recognise that they are not an isolated cogito but, rather, ‘one 
among others’ (Splitter 2011, p. 497). As it is recognised that others are more or less 
similar to oneself, even when we have different thoughts, feelings and experiences, 
we feel compassion towards them as we are united by a sense of common humanity. 
Splitter identifies three key components of this process that are cognitive as well as 
affective. These include, firstly, appreciating my own self-worth, arising from a 
recognition of my role in the community; secondly, appreciating that others are also 
striving for this kind of self-appreciation; and thirdly, ‘understanding that self-
appreciation and appreciation for others are interdependent and mutually 
reinforcing’ (Splitter 2011, pp. 497-8). In seeking shared values that arise from a 
context, in a time and a place, the group must care about one another if it is to 
function well (D’Olimpio [2016] makes a similar argument about the virtue of trust). 
This is further reinforced by Splitter’s remark that ‘[t]he coi is an interactive 
environment whose entire rationale is the wellbeing of its members (in intellectual, 
moral and affective terms)’ (2011, p. 498). Similarly, the virtue ethicist recognises 
individual eudaimonia is intrinsically linked to the wellbeing of the polis (Aristotle 
2009) or, in this instance, the community, including the school community and the 
wider community of which the school is a part. By engaging philosophically with 
narratives within an educational setting, using a CoI pedagogy, children are given 
the opportunity to practise, in a safe space, the moral attitude of compassion, while 
developing their techniques of critical reflection; skills that prepare them for the role 
of living a good life. 
 
Conclusion 
We have suggested that we are story-telling animals who learn from the stories of 
diverse others. Moral agents use rational emotions such as compassion to imagine 
‘what it is like’ for another prior to deciding how they should act. Narrative 
artworks, such as aesthetically and ethically good novels and films, allow us – and 
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young people – the opportunity to engage imaginatively and compassionately with 
diverse characters and scenarios in a safe protected space that is created by the 
fictional world. By practising what Nussbaum calls a ‘loving attitude’, her version of 
ethical attention, we can form virtuous habits that lead to phronesis (practical 
wisdom) and enable us to lead a flourishing life.  
On this basis, we have advanced two main educational arguments which connect 
specifically to the focus of this special issue. The first is the idea that educators have 
a responsibility to engage children in specifically philosophical questions about the 
stories they hear, read, share and explore. In this way narrative artworks provide 
insights and stimulus for engaging with ideas of human nature, human relationships 
and what it means to live a good life. Whether such philosophical questions – which 
require some level of philosophical understanding on behalf of educators – are best 
taught through a specific discrete school subject called philosophy or through other 
curriculum subjects has not been our main focus, given that what seems most 
pressing is whether philosophy should be taught in schools at all. It seems likely to 
us that either (or perhaps both) models of curricular inclusion hold particular 
possibilities. The second main educational argument we have advanced is that 
engaging children in such specifically philosophical questions places certain 
important curricular and pedagogical demands upon schools and teachers, demands 
which can be met by using philosophy as a praxis in the classroom. We have sought 
to illustrate this claim by exploring how teachers can draw upon narrative art in 
classrooms in support of a pedagogy designed to promote caring thinking alongside 
critical, creative and collaborative thinking skills. This may be done by facilitating a 
community of inquiry, a way of practising philosophy in the classroom, which often 
utilises narrative as a provocation in order to generate philosophical questions and 
dialogue from the students who are participants in the inquiry. Teachers may create 
a safe space for students to co-construct meaning via active engagement with 
narratives as a stimulus for students’ own ideas. This leads to students participating 
in meaningful experiences, from which they can learn, reflect and develop virtuous 
habits. By taking seriously the idea of children as embodied, we can value 
experiential and affective knowledge alongside a rational, cognitive epistemology. 
Aesthetic education can work well within this educative approach known as 
philosophy for children (or P4C) in its search for rational and pragmatic wisdom. For 
these reasons, philosophy should be included in the classroom and make use of, 
alongside other texts and stimulus materials, good narrative artworks in order to 
encourage children to be compassionate as well as critical citizens. 
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